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None of Peyote Way's members were tribal Indians, although one of them claimed to have Indian blood, and none of them were members of the Native American Church For the reasons set forth below, neither Peyote Way nor the Native American Church have a free exercise right to use the controlled substance peyote, and a decision holding the federal exemption unconstitutional would have been yet another blow to Native American culture and religion. Why? Because it is unlikely that Congress would expand the exemption to include non-Indians, or other controlled substances, given the considerable potential for abuse such an expansion would provide. For the reasons set forth below, the United States Court of Appeals was right to reject Peyote Way's Equal Protection and Establishment Clause challenges to the federal exemption. An historical sketch of this centuries-old aboriginal religion should provide some insight as to why the federal exemption is so important to Native American peyotists.
Aboriginal Peyotism: An Historical Sketch
Peyotism is centuries old; peyote has been used by Native Americans in their religious rituals for at least four hundred years, culminating in the present day Native American Church.! Peyotism has its origins in pre-Conquest Mexico; Inquisition documents in sixteenth century Mexico describe the religious use of peyote by Mexican Indians? From Mexico peyotism spread into what is now Texas and Oklahoma; Oklahoma tribes practicing peyotism in the 1890s had lived in the Rio Grande Valley a century or more previously." 0 Tribal Indians were using peyote in their religious ceremonies, in territory that would become part of the United States, at approximately the same time the Founding Fathers were in Philadelphia drafting the Constitution of the United States.
"Peyote is a small spineless cactus having psychedelic properties; it grows naturally in a limited area, principally in northern Mexico and southern Texas."'" Peyote is a common ritual hallucinogen that is used in peyotist ceremonies to induce visions; this natural growing plant substance has the capacity to alter consciousness. 2 Peyotism is a noncreedal faith; its members accept a monotheistic deity, and use peyote as a mediator between the human and the divine. 3 Personal psychic experiences of the supernatural, induced by The principal ceremony of peyotism is an all-night ritual that consists of praying, singing, preaching, and testimonials, along with the ingestion of peyote." It is the ingestion of peyote that is the central ritual of peyotism, the ingestion producing a warm and pleasant euphoria. 6 While the peyote religion is saturated with Christian values, representing the acceptance of new social values, "the rituals that remain the core of the cult are entirely native."' 7 The peyote ceremony as it developed in the mountains of north central Mexico is "remarkably similar" to the ceremony as it developed in the United States. 8 Oklahoma was the cradle of peyotism in the United States; one reason for this was the federal government's establishment of reservations in the Indian Territory of Oklahoma. 9 Different Indian peoples, different Indian cultures, and different Indian religions were thrown together on these reservations.' By 1874 the remnants of the Plains Indian tribes were sent to these reservations, along with the "Five Civilized Tribes" that earlier had been removed from the homelands east of the Mississippi River.
2 ' With the coming together of so many diverse tribes, there arose the potential for a variety of pan-tribal or intertribal movements. By the 1880s, with the Indians conquered and in disarray, peyotism flourished on the reservations.' Many of these tribal Indians found comfort in peyotism, and this traditional Indian religion was instrumental in bringing stability to life on the reservations.' By 1910 peyotism was flourishing among the tribal Indians of Oklahoma, and from there it spread to numerous other tribes in Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah and New Mexico. ' Indian defeat and disarray were important factors in the rise of peyotism. New religions tend to rise in times of crisis, and the crisis associated with the rise of peyotism, and other pan-Indian religions, was the encroachment of European culture.' New religions originate in situations perceived by their followers as a crisis in the life of the group, a crisis precipitated by contacts between two cultures. As the tribes were forced from their homelands and 
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Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998 confined to reservations they contemplated the destruction of their traditional way of life.Y Unlike other pan-Indian religions, peyotism was adaptive, putting old traditions to new uses; by the end of the nineteenth century peyotism had fused traditional aboriginal elements with Christian elements, and it was this fused peyotism that spread so rapidly among the numerous tribes of North America.' Peyotism endured by redefining the crisis of white encroachment, emphasizing the maintenance of indigenous values and identity over time. 29 Of all the panIndian religious movements, peyotism was the most popular and durable of all," the most important pan-Indian institution in America."
One should not forget the correlation between peyotism and the triumph of white civilization over the tribes.
2 This religion of accommodation was a response to a shattered status, the response of a defeated people overwhelmed by waves of white settlers?
3 Peyotism, a religion of the oppressed, helped Indians cope with their subordinate status.' This aboriginal American religion was the last of the great pan-tribal religious movements? Many Native Americans believe that peyotism represents the last strong link to an aboriginal past . ' Indeed, in 1918, when tribal leaders decided to incorporate and to choose a name, they chose the name "Native American Church" to emphasize not only intertribal solidarity, but also aboriginality 7 With this background in' mind, a discussion of Peyote Way's constitutional claims is now appropriate.
Even Before the Supreme Court's Decision in Employment Division v. Smith, There Was No Free Exercise Right To Use a Controlled Substance in Violation of Federal Criminal Law
In its lawsuit Peyote Way claimed it had a free exercise right to use peyote in its religious ceremonies, and that 21 U.S.C. § § 841 and 844" which prohibits the possession and distribution of peyote, were unconstitutional as applied to Peyote Way's members. The question is whether the court of appeals In Employment Division v. Smithe8 the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Free Exercise Clause permitted Oregon to include the religious use of peyote within the scope of its general criminal prohibition of controlled substance use, thereby permitting Oregon to deny unemployment benefits to persons fired from their jobs because of their religious use of peyote. 4 ' In answering this question in the affirmative, the Court rejected respondents' claim that their religious motivation placed them beyond the reach of a criminal statute not specifically directed at their religious practice, a statute respondents conceded was constitutional as applied to those who used peyote for nonreligious purposes. 42 The Court was adamant in its refusal to hold "that when otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from government regulation. We have never held that, and decline to do so now."' 3
The respondents also contended that even if the State of Oregon refused to automatically extend an exemption to religiously motivated conduct from generally applicable criminal laws, the Court would have to evaluate the claim under the balancing test of Sherbert v. Verner;," under this test the government must justify any actions that substantially burden a religious practice by a compelling governmental interest. 5 In rejecting this contention, the Court stated that it had "never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of employment compensation. Although we have sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than that, we have always found the test satisfied .... , 6 Moreover, said the Court, "[e]ven if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the employment compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law."' 7 In other words, Sherbert's compelling governmental interest requirement had no applicability whatever to a criminal statute of general applicability. In light of Smith, it is abundantly clear that the Court could not sustain Peyote Way's free exercise claim, and the court of appeals properly rejected Peyote Way's claim on the authority of Smith. Even if the Smith majority had not abandoned the Sherbert test, however, it is difficult to see how Peyote Way's free exercise claim could have been sustained.
A number of commentators have been highly critical of Smith as insufficiently protective of religious liberty, arguing, in essence, that the new test makes accommodation of free exercise interests too dependent on the political process. 49 This widespread criticism is overstated. As one commentator has noted, the claim that Smith threatens religious liberty in some novel way justifies considerable skepticism given that the "generous promises of sensitivity to eccentric religious practices [in the pre-Smith rhetoric of free exercise discourse] were routinely betrayed."" While the pre-Smith test appeared highly protective of religious liberty, it clearly was not, for the Court generally has had only "the weakest commitment" to freedom of religious exercise." Since entering the field, the Court has done little to protect religious freedom against what some have seen as the most powerful governmental threat of all, that posed by the national government. So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the laws of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.
59
Chief Justice Waite's opinion in Reynolds explicitly endorsed the Jeffersonian theory that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment erected a wall of separation between church and state, restricting free exercise to religious belief. Jefferson opposed religious exemptions because they conferred special privileges on believers.
6 ' According to Jefferson, "the opinions of men are not the object of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction ... and it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order." ' This belief-action distinction, characterized as a "secular regulation rule," applied generally from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. 63 In Sherbert v. Verner,' the Supreme Court abandoned the belief-action distinction of Reynolds. Sherbert involved a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church who was fired because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith; unable to find work because she would not work on
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Saturday, she filed for unemployment compensation.' The state denied her application because she would not accept suitable work when offered. ' The Court held that the denial of Sherbert's application imposed a burden on her free exercise of religion.' The Court made a cryptic reference to the distinction between welfare and criminal legislation, noting that no criminal sanctions directly compelled Sherbert to work. Despite only an indirect burden on her right of free exercise, the indirect burden was unconstitutional., Her ineligibility for benefits, said the Court, derived "solely from the practice of her religion.' c 9 The Court went on to consider whether some "compelling state interest" justified the "substantial infringement" of Sherbert's free exercise right, and concluded that "[n]o such abuse or danger has been advanced in the present case." 0 Sherbert suggested that the government could burden the free exercise of religion only if it could show a "compelling" regulatory interest that it could not protect in any less intrusive manner; this less restrictive alternative requirement seemed to impose upon the government the heavy burden of showing that the granting of the exemption would "substantially undermine" the government's compellirng interestY This strict scrutiny test seemed to be heavily weighted toward personal freedom and the accommodation of minority religious practie" Sherbert implied that religious liberty was a value high in the hierarchy of constitutional values, and that accommodation was only a "marginal drag" on the government's regulatory authority, a "marginal drag" that would not justify the burdening of free exercise.' Sherbert, presumably, was a repudiation of the belief-action distinction holding out the promise that religious liberty would prevail over bureaucratic values. 74 With the Court's decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder,"' the promise of Sherbert seemed fulfilled. In Yoder the Supreme Court sustained the claim of members of the Old Order Amish that application of the state's compulsory schoolattendance law, as to them, violated their right to freely exercise their religion. 76 Acknowledging the state's responsibility for the education of its citizens, and its power to impose reasonable regulations in the field of education, the Court nonetheless noted that the state's responsibility "is not totally free from a 
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balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests" such as the right to free exercise.' "[Only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." ' 78 The Court noted the impact of the state's compulsory-attendance law on the Old Order Amish and the practice of their religion, finding that the impact was "not only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compel[led] them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs."
79
The Court went on to reject the notion that religiously grounded conduct was outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, for in the context of free exercise jurisprudence "belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments."
8 Finally, in dealing with the state's claim that "its interest in its system of compulsory education [wa]s so compelling that even the established practices of the Amish must give way," the Court expressed skepticism:
Where fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake... we cannot accept such a sweeping claim; despite its admitted validity in the generality of cases, we must searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to promote by its requirement for compulsory education to age [sixteen] and the impediment to those objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed Amish exemption."
Needless to say, the state failed to satisfy the Court's searching examination of its interests; the state's generalized "compelling" interest was not sufficient.
In Sherbert and Yoder the Court's actions matched its rhetoric. The era of the constitutionally compelled exemption seemed imminent. To Sherbert's requirement that the government justify, by a compelling interest, any law that burdens the free exercise of religion, Yoder added the requirement that the government justify by a compelling interest any refusal to grant an exemption to a religious objector.' Under the doctrine of the constitutionally compelled exemption set forth in Sherbert and Yoder, the Free Exercise Clause mandated the relief of believers from the obligation of obeying any law requiring them to perform any act prohibited by their religious beliefs, or from the obligation of obeying any law prohibiting them from performing an act required by their religious beliefs, unless it would frustrate an overriding or compelling governmental interest by relieving religious believers of their obligation to obey 77. Id. at 214. 
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Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998 the law. ' Undoubtedly, Sherbert and Yoder promised "extraordinary protection" for the free exercise of religion.' M In the years that followed, however, Sherbert and Yoder would not fulfill their promise; there would be no extraordinary protection for the free exercise of religion. Since Yoder the Court has granted no free exercise exemptions outside the field of employment compensation." The Court never extended the constitutionally compelled exemption beyond the facts of Sherbert and Yoder. ' United States v. Lee" marked the beginning of the end of the constitutionally compelled exemption. Lee involved the Old Order Amish, who believed there was a religiously based obligation to provide for its members the type of assistance provided by the social security system; Lee, a member of the Old Order Amish, claimed that both the payment and the receipt of social security benefits was forbidden by the Amish faith, a claim the Court accepted!'
In this conflict between the Amish faith and the obligations imposed by the social security system, the Court held that accommodating the Amish faith would unduly interfere with the government's compelling interest in administering a comprehensive social security system." The broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system was of such a high order, said the Court that religious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes afforded no basis for resisting the tax. ' While purporting to apply a strict scrutiny test in Lee, the Court used something less than strict scrutiny in Goldman v. Weinberger." In this case, Goldman, an orthodox Jew and Air Force officer, contended that he had a free exercise right to wear a yarmulke while in uniform, notwithstanding an Air Force regulation mandating uniform dress for Air Force personnel. Even though the effect of the regulation was to restrict the wearing of the yarmulke required by Goldman's religious beliefs, the Court, utilizing an extremely deferential standard, held that the Air Force regulation was a reasonable one." 98 Roy, a Native American, claimed, among other things, that the state's use of a social security number for his twoyear-old daughter, "Little Bird of the Snow," violated his Native American religious beliefs." In rejecting Roy's claim the Court stated that the Free Exercise Clause "cannot be understood to require the [g]overnment to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens."'" 4 The Court concluded that use of Little Bird of the Snow's social security number did not by itself interfere with Roy's free exercise of religion." 0 ' A Court plurality believed the rational relationship between the use of the social security number and the administration of the food stamp program was sufficient.
Finally, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association," 4 the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the government from constructing a road or permitting timber harvesting in a national forest that historically had been used for religious purposes by Native Americans. The Court forthrightly noted that the road-building and logging projects at issue "could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices."' The Court also observed "that the threat to the efficacy of at least some religious practices was extremely grave."'" 4 Yet, said the Court: One conclusion to be drawn from these Supreme Court cases is that the actual protection afforded the free exercise of religion is not nearly as great as the post-Smith rhetoric seems to suggest." After reading these post-Yoder cases it is impossible to agree with one critic's view of Smith that, after Sherbert and before Smith, the Court required the granting of a religious exemption unless the government could show that the exemption undermined "an overriding, substantial, compelling, or important interest that could not be achieved by some narrower alternative means."" 1 t 0 Such a view mistakes rhetoric for action. The Court's abandonment of the constitutionally compelled exemption doctrine in Smith simply made explicit what had been since Yoder the "functional law of free exercise."" Moreover, prior to Smith, the federal courts of appeals had unanimously refused "to create free exercise havens from violation of the national criminal laws .
"' Not only had the courts of appeals rejected all free exercise challenges to the federal criminal drug statutes,"' but also to federal criminal statutes generally."' Even if the Smith case had never arisen, Peyote Way's free exercise claim seemed bound to fail. 16 
The Marshall Trilogy
From the very beginnings of this Nation's history the Supreme Court of the United States has treated American Indians as a people apart. In Johnson, the primary issue before the Court was whether Indians could give, and non-Indians receive, a title to land that the United States courts would uphold."
7 The Court took this occasion to announce the doctrine of discovery, the original foundation of titles to land on the American continent. This doctrine stated that "discovery gave title to the government... against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by possession."". From the exclusion of all other European nations, there flowed to the discovering nation "the sole right of acquiring the soil from its natives and establishing settlements upon it."" ' 9 The Court noted that in the establishment of this relationship, the rights of the original inhabitants had been "necessarily," and "to a considerable extent, impaired;" but not "entirely disregarded."" The Court continued:
[the original inhabitants] were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as a just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original In short, the discovering nation asserted "ultimate dominion" in itself, while recognizing an "Indian right of occupancy."' " This ultimate dominion, noted Chief Justice Marshall, passed from Great Britain to the United States by the treaty that concluded the Revolutionary War." This power, to grant land with valid title, now possessed by the government of the United States, "has never been questioned in our Courts. It has been exercised uniformly in territory in possession of the Indians."''
In Cherokee Nation the tribe, claiming it was a foreign nation, sought to enjoin the State of Georgia from executing laws providing for the seizure of Cherokee lands."
z The primary issue before the Court was whether "the Cherokee nation [was] a foreign state in the sense in which that term [wa]s used in the constitution?"'" In answering this question in the negative, the Court noted that "[tihe condition of the Indians in relation to the United States [wa]s perhaps unlike that of any two people in existence," a relationship "marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no where else.I'" The Court acknowledged that the Indians had "an unquestioned right to the lands they occupy" until "extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government."'" Yet, said Chief Justice Marshall:
[lit may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile, they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.'9
Simply stated, the Cherokee Nation was a "domestic dependent nation" not a foreign one, a "nation" constitutionally confined to a paternalistic wardship under the tutelage of its guardian, the United States. 
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In Worcester, the last of the Marshall trilogy, the primary issue before the Court was whether a Georgia statute prohibiting "white persons" from residing on Cherokee lands without a state license, and without taking an oath to defend the Georgia constitution, was a law "repugnant" to the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States.' Worcester was a missionary residing on Cherokee lands with tribal permission, and under the authority of a federal statute; Georgia authorities prosecuted and convicted Worcester of violating the state statute, and he was sentenced to four years imprisonment. ' In striking down the Georgia statute" Chief Justice Marshall made several observations about Indian sovereignty vis-4-vis the states of the Union:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from any other intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer .... The very term 'nation,' so generally applied to them means 'a people distinct from others.' The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable of making treaties.
33
The Chief Justice suggested that Georgia had acquiesced "in the universal conviction that the Indian nations possessed a full right to the lands they occupied, until that right should be extinguished by the United States with their consent . . . .'"' The Chief Justice made explicit the proper relationships among the United States, the Indian nations, and the States of the Union:
The Cherokee nation.., is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress. 
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In other words, under our constitutional system, it was the federal government and the federal government alone that was authorized to deal with these "domestic dependent nations."' ' A close reading of the Marshall trilogy demonstrates that while Indian tribes assert a measure of political sovereignty over persons and property within the boundaries of their reservations, Indian tribes are "strange sovereigns" in a constitutional sense." r One reason for this apparent strangeness is our constitutional system. The Supreme Court's primary struggles have been over the allocation of power between the federal and state governments, and between governmental power and individual rights; Indian tribal sovereignty does not fit comfortably into this matrix." In addition, during the eighteenth century, the "individual-state dichotomy" became a powerful influence on Western thought, and this dichotomy leaves little room for "intermediate associational groupings."" ' The dichotomy simply does not lend iiself to assigning such groupings rights not reducible to either the liberties of the individual or the prerogatives of the state." Indian tribes or "nations" are an anomaly in the American constitutional system.
An understanding of the Marshall trilogy is important because in these opinions Chief Justice Marshall created much of our' federal Indian law, tradition.' While these opinions certainly suggest that Marshall was more concerned with centralizing in the federal government power over Indians and their lands than with the "normative consequences" of colonization, one may also read the opinions as establishing a more "normatively attractive vision" of federal Indian law. 42 Critics of the Marshall trilogy 43 often ignore Marshall's concern for the plight of the Indians. In Cherokee Nation, for example, Marshall stated:
If courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better calculated to excite them can scarcely be imagined. A people once numerous, powerful, and truly independent, found by our ancestors in the quiet and uncontrolled possession of an ample domain, gradually sinking beneath our superior policy, our arts and our arms, have yielded their lands by successive treaties, each of which contains a solemn guarantee of the residue, until they retain no 136 Marshall could hardly ignore his role as the Chief Justice of the highest court of a colonizing nation. 5 Marshall forthrightly acknowledged that the doctrines of discovery, conquest, and original Indian title were somewhat "extravagant," and "opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations," yet, said Marshall, if these doctrines "be indispensable to that system under which the country has been settled, and be adapted to the actual conditions of the two people, it may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by Courts of Justice."'" While Marshall was true to his high position in the colonizing government, he was not uncritical of the doctrines of discovery, conquest, and Indian land title; he attempted to accommodate the tribal perspective, especially in Cherokee Nation and Worcester.' 47 In these opinions Marshall attempted to reconcile "the anomalous existence" of the Indians within the Nation's boundaries,'" a difficult task given that the three opinions "were substantially framed by the question of the status of indigenous people within the Vattellian version of international law"' 49 with its emphasis on the individual-state dichotomy. As a formal matter Marshall assumed that he could not entertain fundamental challenges to colonization, yet as a functional matter, he allowed his qualms about colonization to lead him "to create a method of interpretation that presumed tribal sovereignty to be substantial as a matter of law even if weak as a matter of fact."'" If the destruction of tribal sovereignty was the aim, then Marshall would have forced Congress to do it overtly. ' Marshall was adamant in his attempt to keep the states, who were "extraordinarily hostile" to tribal independence, out of the business of colonization altogether." It is difficult to see what more could have been expected from Marshall," for his 144 
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opinions were an attempt to doctrinally curb the most likely excesses of state intrusions into Indian lands, an attempt to blunt the assault of colonization." 4 
The Plenary Power Doctrine
The "mystique of plenary power" has pervaded the federal regulation of Indian affairs from the beginning.'
5
The plenary power doctrine, as exemplified in Worcester, has become a fixture of American Indian law." From the beginning of the Nation's history Congress has assumed "nearly unfettered authority to govern Indian affairs."'" The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs, and has never struck down a federal statute directly regulating any aspect of Indian affairs on the ground that Congress had exceeded its authority."'
A brief look at several early Supreme Court cases illustrate the sweep of the aptly named plenary power doctrine. United States v. Rogers" involved a federal criminal prosecution for murder in Indian county. The federal criminal statute, which Congress made applicable to Indian country, did not apply to crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian." The Court held the prosecution of Rogers, a white man who had been adopted by the Cherokee tribe, was proper in federal court for a murder committed in Indian country. 6 ' More important than the holding was Chief Justice Taney's broad language regarding the discovery doctrine:
The native tribes that were found on this continent at the time of its discovery have never been acknowledged or treated as independent nations by the European governments, nor regarded as the owners of the territories they respectively occupied. On the contrary, the whole continent was divided and parceled out, and granted by the governments of Europe as if it had been vacant and unoccupied land, and the Indians continually held to be, and treated as, subject to their dominion and control.
[ihe Indian tribes residing within the territorial limits of the United States are subject to their authority, and where the country occupied by them is not within the limits of one of the States, 
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Congress may by law punish any offense committed there, no matter whether the offender be a white man or an Indian."
In United States v. Kagama 6 3 the issue before the Court was the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act; this Act made murder, and several other serious offenses, federal crimes if committed by one Indian against another Indian in Indian country. In upholding the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act, the Court noted that congressional power to enact laws governing Indian country originated in "the ownership of the country," and the right of "exclusive sovereignty," vis-k-vis the Indian tribes, which existed in the national government and was found nowhere else." In Kagama the national government claimed ultimate title in the land itself, prohibiting Indian tribes from selling or transferring land to other nations or principals without its consent." The Court concluded its opinion with sweeping language:
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that government, because it has never existed anywhere else; because the theatre of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes. 6 6
In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock "7 the issue before the Court was whether a congressional allotment statute, in conflict with a treaty banning allotments unless consented to by three-fourths of the adult male tribal members, was a valid exercise of congressional power." In sustaining the federal allotment statute the Court stated that "[t]he power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty," for when "treaties were entered into between the United States and a tribe of Indians, it was never doubted that the power to abrogate existed in Congress, and that in a contingency such power might be availed of from considerations of governmental policy .... ."" Kagama and Lone Wolf became the "linchpins" of the plenary power doctrine, a doctrine subject to few judicial limitations.' After Kagama and Lone Wolf congressional authority over Indian tribes was so extensive that 162 Congress had the final say as to who was a tribal member for purposes of distributing property, annuities, and trust money, including the final say as to how that money was spent.' Not until the 1970s did the Court suggest some general constitutional limits on congressional power, and even then only under a highly deferential standard of review." The Supreme Court has "repudiated" the doctrine of plenary power only to the extent the doctrine suggests it is "unlimited."' ' Despite this theoretical narrowing of the plenary power doctrine it remains a potent force." Congress continues to act with what is properly called "breathtaking authority."' 7 The Supreme Court has defined congressional power over Indians in the broadest possible terms, and thus the application of a deferential standard of review to Indian legislation permits "almost any conceivable legislative action.''1 7
From Plenary Power to Minimal Scrutiny: Mancari and Its Progeny
In Morton v. Mancari" T the Court upheld a congressionally mandated employment preference for Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 7 ' In rejecting the equal protection challenge to the preference, the Court emphasized that the preference "[wa]s not directed towards a 'social' group consisting of Indians'; instead, it applie[d] only to members of 'federally recognized' tribes. This operate[d] to exclude many individuals who [we]re socially classified as 'Indians.' In this sense, the preference [wa]s political rather than racial in nature." ' 9 Eligibility for the preference required the individual to have "onefourth or more degree Indian blood," and claim membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe."° The Court again emphasized that the preference was granted to Indians "not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities [we]re governed by the 171. ld. at 224. 172. Frickey, supra note 141, at 1139; see Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) (stating that congressional power over Indian affairs may be of a plenary nature, but it is not absolute; the political question doctrine does not deter this Court from scrutinizing Indian legislation to determine whether it violates the equal protection principle); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554-55 (1974) (stating that congressional legislation that singles out Indians for special treatment will be upheld if the special treatment "can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians").
173. Newton, supra note 137, at 228. 174. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 594 (1977) (holding that congressional power to reduce the boundaries of a reservation without tribal consent or compensation will be upheld based upon the authority of Lone Woof).
175. Noting that it had previously upheld legislation that singled out Indians for special treatment, the Court articulated a minimal scrutiny test:
As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed. Here, where the preference is reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian self-government, we cannot say that Congress' classification violates [the equal protection principle]."
Two years later the Court decided Fisher v. District Court." In Fisher a
Cheyenne tribal member was denied custody of her child in tribal court; another tribal member was awarded temporary custody, with the child being made a ward of the tribal court; the tribal member who was awarded temporary custody by the tribal court sought permanent custody in state court." The Court held that the state court lacked jurisdiction over an Indian adoption proceeding; the denial of access to the state court did not violate the equal protection principle, noted the Court, because the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal court derived not from the race of the tribal member seeking access to the state court, but from the quasi-sovereign status of the tribe under federal law." Citing Mancari the Court concluded that "such disparate treatment of the Indian [wa]s justified because it [wa]s intended to benefit the class of which he [wa]s a member by furthering the congressional policy of Indian self-government." ' One year later the Court decided United States v. Antelope." Antelope involved two tribal Indians who had been convicted in federal court of the felony-murder of a non-Indian on the reservation." The defendants contended that their felony-murder convictions were racially discriminatory because a nonIndian charged with the same crime would have been subject to state law, which required proof of premeditation in a prosecution for first degree murder; premeditation was not required under the federal enclave murder statute 9 In rejecting the racial discrimination argument, the Court cited Mancari and noted that federal legislation "expressly singling out Indian tribes" was supported by the federal government's special relationship with the Indians. 
The Federal Exemption and the Minimal Scrutiny Test of Mancari
As previously noted, the federal exemption" allows members of the Native American Church to use the controlled substance peyote in its bona fide religious ceremonies. The intertribal Native American Church is the latest manifestation of a centuries-old Native American peyotist religion; the Native American Church has approximately 250,000 Native American members, most of whom live on reservations west of the Mississippi River.'" The members of the Native American Church are organized into chapters, with each chapter representing a tribe.' 98 To qualify for membership, the bylaws of the Native American Church require that the member possess one-quarter Indian blood, and that he or she claim membership in a tribe.'" When traveling to Texas to obtain peyote, Native American Church members carry a "certificate of authorization"; this certificate contains, among other things, a tribal enrollment number.c In addition, the Church's articles of incorporation provide for the conducting of its religious rituals in Indian country."'
In its lawsuit Peyote Way contended the federal exemption was a racial classification because it did not contain the words "tribal" or "reservation," and 
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because it classified people only by their membership in the Native American Church. 2 Peyote Way's contention ignored the intertribal nature of the Native American Church, a pan-tribal church that required its members to have at least one-quarter Indian blood, and that they claim membership in a federally recognized tribe. ' In its essentials, the federal exemption is little different than the preference upheld in Mancari; the federal exemption, like the preference upheld in Mancari, requires at least a twenty-five percent blood quantum and membership in a federally recognized tribe. Moreover, the federal exemption is not unlike the various preferences for tribal Indians scattered throughout title 25 of the United States Code. Indeed, as the Court noted in Mancari:
Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations.. . single out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near Indian reservations. If these laws derived from historical relationships, and explicitly designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire title of the United States Code ... would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indian would be jeopardized.
V '
Given the "breathtaking authority"' of Congress over Indian affairs, the federal exemption is easily justified as special treatment "tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation to the Indians .... ." The federal exemption clearly meets the minimal scrutiny test of Mancari because the exemption merely recognizes the traditional and centuries-long history of peyote use in the religious ceremonies of tribal Indians.
The federal exemption shows a certain sensitivity to Native American religion and culture, not unlike the sensitivity shown by the Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, a case involving the equal protection clause of the Indian Civil Rights Act.' Martinez, a tribal member, contended that the tribe's membership rules discriminated on the basis of sex; it did so, argued Martinez, by denying membership to the children of female tribal members marrying outside the tribe, while extending membership to children of similarly situated males.' In rejecting this equal protection argument the Court held that the Indian civil rights statute prescribed a rule of decision for tribal courts;
an individual could not maintain a lawsuit against the tribe, said the Court, because the civil rights statute contained no explicit waiver of tribal sovereign immunity° Despite its narrow construction of the statute, the Court, citing Lone Wolf, emphasized the expansive authority of Congress over Indian affairs" This narrow construction of the Indian civil rights statute was necessary, said the Court, because attempts to apply the equal protection principle in the Indian context might "substantially interfere with a tribe's ability to maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct entity.
22
The Court interpreted the Indian civil rights statute as it did to protect "traditional values of patriarchy still significant in tribal life." ' The Court stressed that Congress, in enacting the Indian civil rights statute, chose not to extend every provision of the Bill of Rights to tribal Indians so as to protect the "unique political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments." M The Court left no doubt, however, that if Congress wanted to authorize such civil actions it was perfectly free to do so, so long as it did so explicitly: "[U]nless and until Congress makes clear its intention to permit the additional intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudication in a federal forum would represent, we are constrained to find that [the Indian Civil Rights statute] does not impliedly authorize [civil actions] against either the tribe or its officers."" 2 ' In Martinez the Court showed an "extraordinary sensitivity 2 6 to the traditional tribal value of patriarchy; Congress, in authorizing the federal exemption, showed an "extraordinary sensitivity" to peyotism, a traditional Native American religion. In these circumstances the United States Court of Appeals properly concluded that the federal exemption did not violate the equal protection principle 7
The The spread of Enlightenment philosophy and natural religion reached its apogee during the Revolutionary period and began to decline by 1800. It was during this period that deism, or rational religion, enjoyed popularity and prestige .just as it had in France; deism was the "cult of reason," the "republican religion," and Jefferson was its "St. Paul." ' Jefferson was aware that Americans would not accept his theology of religious freedom and separation of church and state unless persuaded that traditional Christian doctrine was false; in this endeavor Jefferson found his ally in Paine.' Jefferson believed that when the falsity of Christian doctrine was shown aid its falsity accepted by the mass of mankind, it would then be possible for mankind to firmly attach itself to the "God of the Declaration of Independence," that is, to "Nature's God."'" When the Nation accepted the Jeffersonian theology, the "religious problem" would achieve a resolution and free government be secured.m Many of the Founders had more moderate views. These political and religious centrists were as committed to liberty of conscience as the Enlightenment separationists, but they viewed organized religion as a positive and necessary social cohesive.
3 George Washington, John Adams, John Marshall, Oliver Ellsworth, and the Carrolls of Maryland, for example, believed organized religion was an essential cornerstone of morality, civic virtue, and democratic government.' These political and religious centrists approached the issues of church and state pragmatically, and were less concerned than the Enlightenment Separationists with the specific means of attaining religious liberty; they regarded organized religion as an essential source of personal and 
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social morality, and, when in office, repeatedly recognized the importance of organized religion in the Nation's public life. 5 This centrist position was the predominant one; the centrist position recognized that adoption of the separation principle did not require a secular society, for one could view separation in institutional terms only 6 It did not occur to these political and religious centrists to view society and religion as separate, and if the thought had occurred to them, it would have met with "uniform disapproval." The centrist view recognized the connection between religion and morality, and intuitively understood that religion was an essential pillar of civil society; the same Congress that drafted the Religion Clauses requested President Washington to proclaim a day of public thanksgiving, and approved congressional and military chaplains.0' These political and religious centrists affirmed the importance of religion to the new Republic, demonstrating, by their words and deeds, that the separation of church and state did not mean the separation of religion and politics.
9
Pietistic separationists also believed that the separation of church and state did not mean the separation of religion and politics; pietistic separationists worked to separate church and state only in an "institutional sense." ' The pietistic tradition looked to the thought of Roger Williams and William Penn in aggressively defending religious liberty, a principle they viewed as vital to the purity of the organized church. 24 This tradition emphasized the corrupting effect of government interference'
The most important of the eighteenth century pietistic separationists was the Baptist leader, Isaac Backus, who worked to disestablish Congregationalism in New England; Backus attacked the Congregationalist establishment, believing it was corrupt because of its direct link to the state.
3 While Backus was a sometime ally of Jefferson, he certainly did not desire the secular state envisioned by JeffersonY 4 The reasons Backus and the pietistic separationists had for supporting the separation of church and state were markedly different from those of Jefferson, Paine, and the Enlightenment separationists.0' Jefferson and company believed separation would lead to the casting off of superstitions and shackles on the mind, and would free men for Enlightenment ideas; Backus and company believed separation was its historical inquiry focusing almost exclusively on the Virginia disestablishment, thereby simplifying that which was complex.' Displaying a remarkable unconcern for historical truth and methodology, the Court read Jefferson's Statute for Religious Freedom and equated it with the Establishment Clause; the Court took no note of the obvious objections to equating the two, and took no notice that the statute and the clause were two very different texts, adopted by very different bodies, for very different purposes.' By ignoring the views of the political and religious centrists and the pietistic separationists, the Court flattened and distorted a complex history.
When Jefferson's metaphor of the "wall of separation between church and state" appeared in Everson, the metaphor came clothed in Jeffersonian garb sparkling "with the anticlerical presuppositions of the Enlightenment." ' ' To the extent the Establishment Clause codifies a figure of speech, the clause embraces the "believing affirmations" of Roger Williams and Isaac Backus, no less than the questioning doubts of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.
Since the Court ignored this elementary truth, Establishment Clause jurisprudence was tainted at the source. Everson gave rise to opinions like Lemon v. Kurtzmanan premised on "an historical separation of church and state." '' In Everson the Court laid down historically biased principles for interpreting the Establishment Clause, principles it has never abandoned, often using the three-pronged test of Lemon to enforce its Everson interpretation.' On rare occasions, however, the Court ignores its historical Everson approach and concerns itself with historical practice.
The Federal Exemption and the Historical Approach of Walz and Chambers
As previously noted, peyotism is a religious practice that is centuries-old; as also noted, the federal relationship between the tribal Indians and the federal government is centuries old. The Supreme Court has on occasion used an GOVERNMENT ( holding that in reliance on Lemon, including a clergyman who offered a prayer as part of a public school graduation ceremony, constituted a violation of the Establishment Clause). As the dissent stated, however, the majority opinion "lays waste to a tradition that is as old as public school graduation ceremonies themselves, and that is a component of an even more longstanding American tradition of nonsectarian prayer to God at public celebrations generally." Id. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
